AutoStore is the pioneer and leader in cube-storage automated storage-and-retrieval (AS/RS) systems — a dense, IP-rich robotics grid with patents running 13-18 years, ~72% gross and ~44% adjusted-EBITDA margins, a growing installed base with recurring service/parts, and a systems-integrator partner network. The spring-2026 software/AI layer (CubeVerse, AutoStore Intelligence, VersaAI) adds a cross-sell/TCO angle on top of the hardware platform.
The full deep-dive confirms the binding constraint is the balance sheet, not the operations: goodwill (USD 1,108m) plus acquisition/PPA intangibles (USD 507m) from the 2019 Thomas H. Lee/EQT buyout are 84.6% of invested capital. On that base, adjusted ROIC of 8.57% clears the 8% WACC by only ~0.6pp and economic profit is a marginal +USD 10.9m — elite unit economics earning a thin spread over a very large capitalized base.
This is an early recovery off a 2024/25 destocking trough (FY2025 revenue -10.4%, adjusted-EBIT margin 41.5%->34.3%), not a cycle peak: Q1'26 revenue +92.9% (base-flattered off an unusually weak Q1'25), order intake +27% YoY and a record, rising backlog of USD 571m. The group cut external debt USD 229m in 2025 and sits at 0.5x net-debt/adjusted-EBITDA with USD 411m of liquidity.
At NOK 11.4 the equity is ~NOK 39bn market cap / ~USD 4.1bn EV — roughly 25x adjusted NOPAT, ~20x our adjusted EBIT and ~2.1x invested capital. A reverse-DCF anchors conservative-growth fair value near NOK 5; the price embeds ~7-8% perpetual growth, i.e. the market pays ~2x IC for a business whose blended ROIC barely clears WACC — a bet that future economic profit expands materially.
That bet rests on two levers: cyclical operating leverage restoring 40%+ margins on a higher revenue base, and the capital-light software/AI attach lifting incremental ROIC above the buyout-dragged blended rate. Base NOK 12 (recovery already priced); bull NOK 18 (cycle reaccelerates + software re-rating); bear NOK 8 (destocking resumes, margins compress, reverts toward IC-justified value).
At today’s enterprise value the constant-ROIC reverse-DCF maxes out: even at its sustainable-growth ceiling (~8.1%, limited by ROIC 9% ≈ WACC 8%) it cannot reach the current EV. No-growth value is $0/share (2% of price); the market prices in growth and/or a higher ROIC than booked — richly valued on this lens. Read the sensitivity grid.
| Scenario | 24m target | Impl. g | Upside | Prob. | Driver |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull | $18 | ≥8% | +58% | 25% | Cycle reaccelerates + software/AI attach lifts incremental ROIC + re-rating |
| Base | $12 | ≥8% | +5% | 45% | Recovery priced; ~2.1x IC, ~7-8% implied perpetual growth |
| Bear | $8 | ≥8% | -30% | 30% | Destocking resumes, margins compress; reverts toward IC-justified value |
| Prob-weighted | $12 | — | +8% | 100% | Scenario-weighted expected value |
| WACC \ g | 0% | 3% | 5% | 8% | 10% | 15% |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 6.50% | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 7.25% | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 8.00% (base) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 8.75% | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 9.50% | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Green = fair value above the current price of $11.41. The reverse-DCF conclusion is dominated by WACC and growth — see the whole surface, not a single fair value.
⤓ Download the full model (.xlsx) — formula-driven sheets; flex the blue input cells and the model cascades in Excel.
Pioneer/leader in cube-storage AS/RS; patents run 13-18 years.
~72% gross, ~44% adjusted-EBITDA; 82% cash conversion in Q1'26.
Order intake +27% YoY, record USD 571m backlog off the destocking trough.
CubeVerse/VersaAI add a capital-light cross-sell layer that could lift incremental ROIC.
External debt cut USD 229m in 2025; net-debt 0.5x, USD 411m liquidity.
Thesis holds and is now evidence-backed: the borsdata proxy is replaced by a full manual deep-dive that confirms adjusted ROIC ~8.6% and — properly computed on the buyout-heavy IC — economic profit of only +USD 10.9m, versus the +USD 85m proxy the prior structured-data note carried. Value creation is thinner than the proxy implied, which reinforces rather than flips the HOLD: a genuinely high-quality operator on an expensive, LBO-heritage balance sheet, priced for an EP expansion it has yet to deliver.
HOLD, medium conviction; base target retained at NOK 12 (~+5%), no margin of safety. The recovering cycle and software attach are the upside; a return to destocking and the marginal ROIC-WACC spread are why the current price already asks a lot. Re-rate to BUY only on evidence that returns on new capital run well above the blended rate.
Every adjustment traces to the cited note/page in the source filing — click to open it there. Annual report / 10-K: 📄 open · Latest interim: 📄 open
| Adjustment / figure | Value | Source | Why mttssn treats it this way |
|---|---|---|---|
| LTM revenue 618.5 (FY 538.6 - Q1'25 85.9 + Q1'26 165.8) | 618 | Consolidated Statement of Comprehensive Income p.173 / Q1 IS p.7 📄 p.173 | LTM flow: FY2025 anchor (538.6, revenue -10.4% YoY off a destocking year) less weak Q1'25 (85.9) plus rebound Q1'26 (165.8) |
| LTM EBIT 185.4 (FY 140.1 - Q1'25 7.8 + Q1'26 53.1) | 185 | Operating profit p.173 / Q1 IS p.7 📄 p.173 | Operating profit rolled to LTM; reported EBIT margin ~30% |
| LTM effective tax rate 21.6% (LTM tax 34.5 / LTM PBT 159.5) | 0.216 | Income tax expense p.173 / Q1 p.7; Note 5.1 tax reconciliation p.229 📄 p.173 | Norway statutory 22% starting point; Pillar Two N/A (group below EUR 750m consolidated-revenue threshold, Note 5.1). LTM blended 21.6% |
| Restructuring/transformation + ERP add-back (LTM 20.7) | 20.7 | APM reconciliation p.259-260 (Transformation 19.0 + ERP 1.3) + transformation cost reconciliation p.261; Q1 ERP 0.4 p.10 📄 p.260 | Non-recurring transformation project commenced Q2 2025 (severance, structural changes, B1 inventory write-down) + discrete ERP roll-out; added back pretax |
| B1-Robot intangible impairment add-back (2.0) | 2 | IS impairment p.174; Note 3.4 internal-development impairment 0.9 p.211; Note 3.1 PP&E 0.1 p.204; description p.212 📄 p.211 | One-off write-down from closing development projects / ending the B1-Robot business line; NOT goodwill impairment (annual goodwill test passed). Post-tax add-back |
| PPA amortization REJECTED (LTM 20.2) | 20.2 | APM Adjusted-EBIT bridge 'PPA amortizations' p.259 (FY 19.6); Q1 p.10-11 (Q1'26 5.2) 📄 p.259 | Amortization of 2019 THL/EQT-buyout base-technology/patents/customer-relationship intangibles is the real cost of revenue-generating IP; mttssn keeps it in opex |
| Option/SBC REJECTED (LTM 7.3) | 7.3 | APM 'Option costs' p.259 (FY 4.8); Q1 p.10 (Q1'26 1.9, Q1'25 -0.6) 📄 p.259 | Share-based compensation incl. related payroll tax is a genuine recurring economic expense; not added back |
| Company Adjusted EBIT (LTM 233.6) | 234 | Adjusted EBIT p.259 (FY 184.8); Q1 p.10 (Q1'26 60.6, Q1'25 11.8) 📄 p.259 | Company APM = EBIT + option + transformation + ERP + PPA. LTM = 184.8 - 11.8 + 60.6 = 233.6; our divergence is exactly the rejected PPA+SBC net of the impairment treatment |
| Goodwill test PASSED — no impairment, headroom robust | 0 | Note 3.5 Impairment p.213-215 📄 p.213 | Annual test 31.12.2025: recoverable amount (value-in-use) > carrying, no impairment; single AutoStore-system CGU; pre-tax discount 12.1% (11.9% PY), terminal growth 2.0%; 'no reasonably possible change in key assumptions' would breach; supported by P/B 2.6 |
| Goodwill 1,108.1 + Intangibles 506.6 (Q1'26 SoFP) | 1,615 | Interim SoFP 31.03.2026 p.9 (Goodwill 1,108.1 + Intangible assets 506.6) 📄 p.9 | Buyout-heritage goodwill/PPA base = 84.6% of IC and 78.6% of total assets; the binding constraint on adjusted ROIC despite ~44% adj-EBITDA margins |
| Invested capital 1,907.7 (Q1'26 snapshot) | 1,908 | Interim SoFP 31.03.2026 p.9; OCI split from FY Statement of Changes in Equity p.179 📄 p.9 | equity_ex_oci 1815.1 (equity 1619.7 less cumulative translation reserve -195.4) + IB debt 164.2 - excess cash 71.6; leases excluded (peripheral) |
| IB debt 164.2 (Q1'26), deleveraged (repaid 44.1 in Q1) | 164 | Non-current interest-bearing liabilities p.9; Note 4.2 debt detail p.218 📄 p.9 | Down from FY 210.6; Q1'26 repaid USD 44.1m external debt; net-debt ratio 0.5x adj-EBITDA (from 1.1x) |
| Order backlog 570.6 / order intake 179.4 (+27.0% YoY) | 571 | Q1 2026 highlights p.2 (backlog progression 512.7 -> 529.2 -> 542.5 -> 557.0 -> 570.6; order intake 179.4 vs 141.2) 📄 p.2 | Record backlog and +27% order intake confirm a recovering demand cycle off the 2024/25 trough, not a peak |
How the mttssn view has evolved — each prior dated note is preserved.