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ShaMaran Petroleum (SNM-SDB.ST)
Energi · Kurdistan E&P (ShaMaran Petroleum) · LTM Q1 2026
Analysis date: 2026-07-16
Price at analysis: $1.31
Method: mttssn_streamlined_v1
Conviction: MEDIUM
SELL
Conviction: MEDIUM
Single-region Kurdistan E&P whose LTM economics (ROIC 17.4%, EP +$35.6M) are real but not a run-rate: both blocks shut in since 2026-03-02 on Iran-war security, the FY2025 audit carries a going-concern paragraph, and SEK 1.31 already capitalizes LTM NOPAT at a 12% frame with zero growth. No cushion for shut-in duration, KRG receivables or the 2029 bond. SELL.
Adj. ROIC
17.4%
WACC 8% → spread +9.4pp
Economic Profit
+$36M
+$35.6M at 8%; ~$20.5M at the 12% bond frame
FCF Yield
n/a
LTM $27.3M pre-debt-service; Q1'26 only $2.2M
Price / Target
SEK 1.31 → SEK 1.00
-24% base; SELL
Revenue (LTM)
$157M
LTM $157M; includes ~1 shut-in month
EBIT Margin
41.1%
EBIT 41.1%; international pricing + lower depletion
EV / IC
n/a
Enterprise value / invested capital
Net Debt
n/a
$107.2M net; 12% 2029 bond, extended twice
Thesis

ShaMaran holds non-operated interests in the Atrush (50%) and Sarsang (18%) PSCs in Kurdistan. On an LTM Q1 2026 basis the economics look strong — revenue $157M, EBIT margin 41.1%, adjusted NOPAT $65.7M, adjusted ROIC 17.4% against an 8% WACC, economic profit +$35.6M — helped by the ITP export restart in September 2025 and international pricing ($63.08/bbl realized in Q1, +88% YoY).

But the LTM is not a run-rate. Both blocks have been shut in since 2026-03-02 on Iran-war regional security, with explosions at Sarsang processing and storage facilities in March and April; blocks were still shut at the 2026-05-06 report date. The FY2025 auditor's report carries a material-uncertainty going-concern paragraph, and the interim KRG/Iraq pricing regime ($16/bbl cost compensation, extended to 2026-06-30) is transitional, not the full PSC entitlement.

At SEK 1.31 the market pays full value for the LTM: capitalizing $65.7M NOPAT at the 12% bond-coupon frame with zero growth, net of $107.2M net debt, lands almost exactly on the price. That leaves nothing for the scenario in which the shut-in persists, the $52.8M Overdue Receivables slip further, or the twice-extended 12% bond needs a third amendment. Downside-skewed; we step aside.

Valuation · reverse-DCF & scenarios

The record carries no reverse-DCF; the arithmetic from its own figures is stark. LTM adjusted NOPAT $65.7M capitalized at 12% (the company's own bond coupon — the honest frame for a going-concern single-region Kurdistan credit) with zero growth, less $107.2M net debt, gives ~$440M of equity ≈ SEK 1.31 per SDR at the record's implied ~8.6 FX — precisely the price. The market is already paying for the LTM as if it were repeatable; only at a generous 8% frame (~SEK 2.1) is there upside, and 8% is the wrong rate here.

Base SEK 1.00 (−24%): shut-in resolves slowly, run-rate NOPAT settles below the LTM under transitional pricing, valued at the 12% frame. Bull SEK 2.10 (+60%): restart plus full PSC entitlement and Overdue Receivables recovery re-rates the equity toward the 8% frame. Bear SEK 0.45: prolonged shut-in forces a bond amendment or dilutive raise. 24-month horizon.

Market-implied growth
≥16.5%
model ceiling — EV implies more than constant-ROIC sustains
No-growth value / share
$0
1% of price; rest = priced-in growth
ROIC − WACC
+9.4 pp
ROIC 17.4% vs WACC 8.0% — positive = value creation
CAP (priced-in)
22.0 yrs
years of excess returns the price implies (fades to WACC)

At today’s enterprise value the constant-ROIC reverse-DCF maxes out: even at its sustainable-growth ceiling (~16.5%, limited by ROIC 17% ≈ WACC 8%) it cannot reach the current EV. No-growth value is $0/share (1% of price); the market prices in growth and/or a higher ROIC than booked — richly valued on this lens. Read the sensitivity grid.

Scenario24m targetImpl. gUpsideProb.Driver
Bull$2≥17%+60%25%Restart + full PSC entitlement + receivables recovered
Base$1≥17%-24%45%Sub-LTM run-rate at the 12% frame; slow resolution
Bear$0≥17%-66%30%Prolonged shut-in; bond amendment or dilutive raise
Prob-weighted$1-15%100%Scenario-weighted expected value

Sensitivity — fair value / share at WACC × growth

WACC \ g0%3%5%8%10%15%
6.50%000000
7.25%000000
8.00% (base)000000
8.75%-000000
9.50%-0-0-0000

Green = fair value above the current price of $1.31. The reverse-DCF conclusion is dominated by WACC and growth — see the whole surface, not a single fair value.

Method & data. NOPAT $66, invested capital and ROIC 17.4% are observed (adjustments.json); WACC 8.0% and terminal g 2.5% are assumptions. EV→equity uses net debt $921. The model holds ROIC constant (no fade) over the explicit horizon; the CAP figure instead fades excess returns to WACC.

⤓ Download the full model (.xlsx) — formula-driven sheets; flex the blue input cells and the model cascades in Excel.

Key drivers

1. Restart & full PSC entitlement

Interim agreements extended to 2026-06-30; IOCs expect full PSC-entitlement payment after independent reconciliation — the bull lever.

2. Production restart

Both blocks shut since 2026-03-02 as a security precaution; a restart restores a 41%-EBIT-margin, ~$65M-NOPAT run-rate.

3. International pricing

Q1 2026 realized $63.08/bbl, +88% YoY, as exports moved from local sales to the ITP at Kirkuk-blend OSP with no SOMO payment delays to date.

4. Receivables recovery

$52.8M Overdue Receivables (Oct 2022–Mar 2023) plus $43.3M 2025 ITP entitlement — collection is straight value to equity.

5. Near-zero PSC tax

KRG settles income tax out of the government share of profit oil; LTM effective tax ~0.3% keeps NOPAT ≈ EBIT.

Key risks
Conclusion

ShaMaran's LTM numbers describe a business that stopped running in March. With a going-concern qualification, both fields shut, a transitional pricing regime and a 12% bond, SEK 1.31 — full value for the LTM at the bond-coupon frame — offers no margin of safety. SELL, medium conviction; base target SEK 1.00 (−24%).

The bull path is real (restart, full PSC entitlement, receivables recovery → ~SEK 2.1) but it is an option, not a base case. Re-visit on a confirmed production restart plus completed PSC reconciliation — quality of the producing asset is not the issue; the claim on it is.

Footnote evidence & sources

Every adjustment traces to the cited note/page in the source filing — click to open it there. Annual report / 10-K: 📄 open  ·  Latest interim: 📄 open

Adjustment / figureValueSourceWhy mttssn treats it this way
FY2025 revenue $154.9M / EBIT $49.0M / net income $26.8M155Consolidated Statement of Comprehensive Income, p.27 (printed) 📄 p.29FY anchor for LTM flow items; no NCI so income for the year = attributable to parent.
Q1 2026 revenue $38.0M / EBIT $20.8M / net income $17.0M (Q1 2025: $35.9M / $5.2M / -$1.1M)38.031Condensed Interim Statement of Comprehensive Income, p.17 (printed) 📄 p.19Quarter added/subtracted for LTM: revenue 154.869 - 35.885 + 38.031 = 157.0; EBIT 48.958 - 5.242 + 20.782 = 64.5.
Q1 2026 balance sheet: equity $264.1M, borrowings $131.8M, accrued bond interest $14.0M, cash $36.5M264Condensed Interim Balance Sheet, p.18 (printed) 📄 p.20IC snapshot at 2026-03-31: equity ex-OCI + bond carrying + accrued interest + pension $0.4M - excess cash $33.4M = $376.9M.
Non-recurring costs $4.651M FY2025 / $3.217M Q1 2025 / $0 Q1 20261.434MD&A Non-IFRS Measures, Adjusted EBITDAX reconciliation (FY p.13; Q1 report p.9 printed) 📄 p.13LTM $1.4M of bond-amendment and redomiciliation project costs added back pre-tax — transaction-related, not operating. We do NOT add back the SBC component of the company's Adjusted EBITDAX.
KRG receivables: $52.8M Overdue Receivables (Oct 2022-Mar 2023) + $43.3M 2025 ITP entitlement; ECL provision $11.2M84.903Note 14 Accounts receivable, p.44 (printed) 📄 p.46Core counterparty risk: recovery timing of Overdue Receivables uncertain; $22.9M classified non-current. ECL movements kept in operating results (LTM net +$0.05M credit, immaterial).
2029 Bond: $143.8M nominal, 12% coupon, maturity extended to July 2029, ACR covenant >= 1.25x144Note 17 Borrowings, p.45 (printed) 📄 p.47Carrying value $131.8M below nominal (modification accounting); IC uses carrying + accrued interest. Maturity extended twice (2025->2027->2029) — refinancing risk is the balance-sheet story.
Going concern: material uncertainty (Note 2b + auditor's report)NoneNote 2b Going concern, p.31 (printed); auditor's report p.24 (PDF) 📄 p.33ITP closure aftermath + production shut-in since 2026-03-02 lend significant doubt on ability to meet obligations; auditor's opinion carries a material-uncertainty paragraph. Caps any quality read on the 17% ROIC.
No impairment on Atrush/Sarsang CGUs in FY20250Note 13 Property, plant and equipment / Note 4d 📄 p.45CGU assessment: carrying amounts did not exceed recoverable amounts — no impairment or reversal in the LTM window; post_tax_addbacks = 0.
Q1 2026: production shut-in since March 2, 2026; Sarsang explosions Mar 5 and Apr 1; blocks still shut at MD&A dateNoneMD&A Highlights + Subsequent Events, p.2 (PDF) 📄 p.2LTM economics reflect only ~1 month of shut-in; run-rate revenue/NOPAT are materially below LTM if the shut-in persists. Primary forward-looking risk.
LTM FCF before debt service $27.3M (FY 62.956 + Q1'26 2.168 - Q1'25 37.780)27.344MD&A Non-IFRS Measures, FCF reconciliation, p.9 (printed) 📄 p.11Company APM CFO+CFI; Q1 2026 fell to $2.2M on drilling/debottlenecking capex and receipt timing.
Quality · Buffett tenets4 / 15
Understandable business
Simple single-commodity model — two non-operated KRI PSC interests (Atrush 50%, Sarsang 18%), oil sold via SOMO — but the cash-flow regime is politically set: interim $16/bbl cost compensation at Kirkuk-blend OSP to 2026-06-30 pending PSC reconciliation, and the record since 2022 is a chain of pipeline closures and shut-ins, not a history you can model forward.
Durable moat
[immateriella (PSC-licens/reglering) · eroderar] The 20-year Atrush/Sarsang PSCs are a real licensed-resource barrier, but the entitlement itself is contested: interim pricing pays $16/bbl cost compensation vs full PSC terms, all exports run through a single buyer (SOMO, ~30-day arrears) and $52.8M of Oct 2022–Mar 2023 entitlements remain unpaid ($11.2M ECL taken); the LTM spread (+9.4pp at 8% WACC) is not a run-rate with both blocks shut since 2026-03-02; falsifierare: non-extension of the interim agreement past 2026-06-30, or a reconciliation that entrenches sub-PSC pricing.
Management & capital allocation
[allokering · candor] Candor is decent — APM divergence 1.7%, the only add-back we reject is $1.2M SBC — and the Sarsang 18% purchase booked a $70.3M bargain-purchase gain (FY2024), opportunistic buying; but the 12% bond has needed two maturity extensions (2025→2027→2029) and a Nemesia related-party loan (repaid Aug 2025) shows the balance sheet run at the edge; röd flagga: another bond amendment or a dilutive raise if the shut-in persists.
Financial strength & returns
LTM adjusted ROIC 17.4% vs 8% WACC and EP +$35.6M (~$20.5M at the 12% bond-coupon frame) — but the FY2025 auditor's report carries a material-uncertainty going-concern paragraph, net debt is $107.2M at a 12% coupon, and Q1 2026 FCF fell to $2.2M with production at zero since March; the balance sheet is in the bad year now.
Valuation margin of safety
At the record's implied ~8.6 SEK/USD, SEK 1.31 exactly capitalizes LTM adjusted NOPAT $65.7M at 12% with zero growth net of $107.2M net debt — full value for an earnings stream that stopped on 2026-03-02, with no cushion for shut-in duration, receivable slippage or the 2029 refinancing.